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Abstract
This thesis looks at how the accounting industry is regulated in Ireland. It looks at the
legislation regarding the supervision of the industry and the bodies which are responsible
for that supervision. It specifically looks at how accountancy firms across the country are
monitored in terms of quality assurance. The effectiveness of the monitoring process is
examined in order to discover how the current regulations impact on firms and what this
means for the clients, those who need to have confidence in the quality of service that they
are getting in order to successfully run their businesses at this time of economic recession.
In order to conduct the research, the author decided that an interpretive philosophy was
most appropriate because it would allow for a flexible approach to be taken when collecting
the data. The data was collected by conducting in depth semi structured interviews which
allowed the author the flexibility and opportunity to adapt to changes in direction whenever
necessary.
The results, based on interviews with accountants and those who monitor and supervise
them, show that the monitoring process in regulatory areas such as auditing are effective.
Professional accountants are very open and receptive to the monitoring process, are willing
to learn and want to serve their clients as best they can. The study does however show a
gap outside of the regulatory areas where monitoring is not mandatory for those who are
performing accounting tasks but are not members of one of the professional accountancy
bodies. As the level of non-regulatory work is increasing, this research highlights some of
the challenges facing accountants and those who supervise the industry in the future.
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Chapter One: Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Starting a new business enterprise can be a daunting affair particularly in the current
economic climate. Statistics vary, but indicate that up to 50% of new businesses fail within
the first five years (Shane, 2008).
The figures in recent years during the existing recession in Ireland are also startling with
eight failures per day currently among existing businesses (Richardson, 2012). There are
many reasons given for business failures but a lot of these reasons may be classified under
poor planning (Goltz, 2011).
It is important to get good advice when planning and starting a new business. Professional
accountants are providers of such business advice. The modern day accountant should be
more than just a bean counter and should be seen as a vital part of a business (Gorman,
2006). Finding the right person who provides appropriate and timely advice could ensure
survival and growth instead of failure.
The key questions for most people looking for the services of an accountant include: how do
I know I am getting a quality service and proper professional advice? Who will ensure that
the accountant providing the service is doing so in a professional and quality manner? What
are the quality standards for accountants, how are these standards measured and by
whom?
This thesis explores how accountants and accountancy firms are monitored and supervised
regarding the quality of service that they provide to their clients. It looks at how the
accounting industry is structured in Ireland and the changes that have taken place in the last
ten years. It investigates the attitude of accountants towards monitoring and attempts to
discover how effective the monitoring process is.
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1.2 Structure of the accounting industry in Ireland
The accounting industry in Ireland has a three tier structure. The industry as a whole is
overseen by the Irish Auditing and Accounting Supervisory Authority (IAASA). IAASA was set
up under the 2003 Companies Act. Prior to the establishment of IAASA, the industry was
supervised directly by the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment (IAASA, 2006).
Part of the role of IAASA is to supervise how the Prescribed Accountancy Bodies (PABs)
regulate and monitor their members and promote adherence to high professional standards
in the auditing and accountancy profession (IAASA, n.d.).
There are nine PABs in Ireland, listed in Figure 1. In order for an individual to become a
member of one of these bodies they must successfully complete the body’s professional
examinations, obtain a minimum period of relevant work experience and undertake to
comply with the body’s bye-laws, regulations and standards as applicable (IAASA, 2011).
Members of any of the PABs are entitled to use the body’s designatory letters and must
complete Continuing Professional Development (CPD) which is ongoing training that keeps
them up to date with changes in regulations and international accounting and auditing
standards. In order for a member to provide services to the public, they must apply annually
for and obtain a practicing certificate which authorises them to do so. In order to obtain a
practicing certificate, they must meet certain criterion which includes having minimum
levels of Professional Indemnity Insurance (PII) and having practice continuity arrangements
in place. Members who meet these requirements are granted practicing certificates which
enables them to provide services to the public but which does not entitle them to conduct
work in regulatory areas such as auditing and investment business (IAASA, 2011).
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Figure 1
Name of Body Prescribed Body Recognised Body
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland (ICAI) Yes Yes
Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) Yes Yes
Institute of Certified Public Accountants in Ireland (ICPAI) Yes Yes
Institute of Incorporated Public Accountants (IIPA) Yes Yes
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Scotland (ICAS) Yes Yes
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales (ICAEW) Yes Yes
Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA) Yes No
Association of International Accountants (AIA) Yes No
Chartered Institute of Public Finance & Accountancy (CIPFA) Yes No
Of the nine PABs, six of the bodies are also recognised as being able to authorise their
members to conduct statutory and public audits, under the Companies Act 1990 and the
Statutory Audit Directive Regulations (IAASA, 2011). These six Recognised Accountancy
Bodies (RABs) are listed in Figure 1. Any company or business that is required to have their
accounts audited under company law must do so, on an annual basis, and make that return
to the Companies Registration Office (CRO). The return must be completed by a registered
auditor. The CRO receives a list of all registered auditors from the RABs as required under
the Statutory Audit Directive Regulations. In order for an individual to become a registered
auditor, they must first be a member of one of the RABs and hold the appropriate
authorisation which is in addition to the criteria required for a practicing certificate.
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The additional requirements will normally include having an appropriate audit qualification
and having sufficient and appropriate post-membership audit experience (IAASA, 2011).
At the 31st December 2011, there were a total of 3,301 practicing certificates issued by the
nine PABs in Ireland. Of the 3,301 certificates issued, 3,007 were issued by just three of the
nine PABs. The three bodies were the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland (ICAI),
the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) and the Institute of Certified
Public Accountants in Ireland (ICPAI). These three bodies issued over 91% of all the
practicing certificates to members in Ireland in 2011 (IAASA, 2011).
There were 1,612 registered auditors in Ireland at 31st December 2011. The ICAI, ACCA and
ICPAI issued 1,495 of these registration certificates which represented over 92% of the total
issued by the six RABs (IAASA, 2011).
1.3 The Quality Assurance Monitoring Process
Each of the PABs is responsible for the monitoring of their members in terms of quality
assurance. This is not however a regulatory requirement. The regulations state that only
those firms performing statutory and public audits are required to be monitored. Every
audit firm will receive a review and monitoring visit every six years. Firms that are auditing
Public Interest Entities (PIE) are subject to reviews every three years (IAASA, 2006). A PIE is
defined as being a public listed company, a bank or an insurance company (ACCA, 2009)
Each of the PABs has their own risk assessment process to determine how often they must
review their members. The Central Bank requires that firms who have investment business
clients also be monitored. This is done by the appropriate PAB.
1.4 Research Aim and Objectives
The primary aim of this research was to discover if the quality assurance monitoring process
adds value for the client. In addition, it was hoped to determine that if complying with the
monitoring process adds additional costs to the firm.
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The objectives of the study are as follows;
1. To determine how often firms are monitored.
2. To discover how the PABs perform their monitoring duties and to establish how it varies
between bodies.
3. To discover how complying with quality assurance reviews effects firms.
4. To determine if the firms believe that the monitoring process improves the quality of
service the client receives.
1.5 Dissertation Layout
The remaining chapters of this dissertation are laid out as follows.
Chapter two: Literature Review
This chapter reviews the literature that has been previously written on the subject. It
identifies issues that have arisen and the problems that existed because of them.
Chapter three: Methodology
Chapter three looks at the methods used by the researcher to complete this project. It
compares the methods chosen with others available and justifies the choice. The researcher
gathered primary data by conducting semi structured interviews with a range of Irish
accountancy firm who are members of the three main RABs: ICAI, ACCA and ICPAI.
Interviews were also conducted with representatives from two of the three listed bodies
and with a representative of IAASA.
Chapter four: Findings
The responses received in the interviews were analysed and the findings presented in this
chapter. The issues are discussed and compared to existing literature.
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Chapter Five: Conclusion
Chapter five provides an overall review of the study. It examines the successfulness of the
research and the issues arising as a result. It also identifies areas for future investigation.
1.6 Limitations of the Study
This study is intended to give the reader an insight into how accountants and accountancy
firms are supervised, in terms of how they provide services to their clients and the quality of
such work.
However due to the constraints imposed by the limited availability of time and resources,
the number of interviews possible was restricted. Some allowance must also be made for
the possibility of a degree of human bias in the author’s interpretation of the findings.
As a result, it is impossible to be conclusive about the results this small scale study provided.
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Chapter Two: Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
The professional accountancy industry in Ireland is overseen by the regulatory body IAASA,
which was established by the Companies’ Act 2003. IAASA was established as an
independent authority and part of its role is to supervise how the PABs regulate and
monitor their members.
In order for a professional accountant or accounting firm to apply for or renew their
practicing certificate, they must comply with the regulations of the PAB that they are a
member of (ACCA, 2009; IIPA, 2010). These regulations include reviews of the quality
assurance systems used by the firms to deliver their services (IAASA, 2007). The purpose of
having a quality assurance system is to ensure that the firm is aware of, and is complying
with its statutory and regulatory obligations. That it is identifying all its clients’ needs. That it
is maintaining a paper-based or electronic system of recording communications with clients
and that all staff have access to the most recent technical knowledge and skills through
training (ACCA, 2009). The PABs conduct these reviews by means of a desktop review and
monitoring visits (POB, 2010). Desktop reviews usually consist of the inspection of an annual
return and questionnaire. Practices are then subject to monitoring visits, the frequency of
which is risk-based (ACCA, 2009). The monitoring visits vary between two and six years.
When a practice has been selected for a visit, the body will liaise with the practice regarding
the timing of the visit and details of what it will entail. The length of the visit will depend on
the size of the practice and the type of work it is involved in. After the completion of the
visit, the reviewer will then compile a report on the practice. This report will contain the
recommendations made to the firm and although they are not obliged to adopt the
recommendations, they are encouraged to conform in order to ensure best practice (ACCA,
2009). If a firm is found to have more serious deficiencies and does not implement the
recommendations made, then it can have restrictions imposed or have its practice
certificate withdrawn (ACCA, 2009; IIPA, 2010). The PABs produce annual reports which
detail the number of monitoring visits made and the results (CARB, 2011).
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IAASA also publishes an annual report that includes details of sanctions imposed (IAASA,
2010). The majority of complaints are quality related (IAASA, 2011).
Practices involved in the audit of PIEs are subject to monitoring visits every three years as
are firms who have had an unsatisfactory outcome to their previous monitoring visit. At
present, a PIE is defined as being a public listed company, a bank or an insurance company
(ACCA, 2009).
For smaller practices not performing audits on PIEs, the PABs also monitor how they supply
their services and conduct their business (ACCA, 2009). This is performed in a similar
manner to the supervision of larger practices but the frequency of visits is approximately
once every six years provided they have had a satisfactory outcome to their previous visit
(Haythornthwaite, 2004). Where a practice is newly appointed as a member of a PAB, they
will be subject to a visit within the first few years of business and may have a visit within the
first twelve months if the relevant body feels that it is necessary (CPA, 2006a).
Quality reviews are conducted in many countries worldwide and most would indicate that
the purpose of a review is educational and remedial, not punitive (Alkafaji, 2007). The
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) is a non-governmental organisation that is
responsible for setting standards and ethical guidelines on auditing and accounting (Loft et
al, 2005; Bather A. and Burnaby P., 2006). The IFAC states that “The purpose of the
monitoring program is to assist the firm in obtaining reasonable assurance that its policies
and procedures relating to the system of quality control are relevant, adequate, and
operating effectively. The program is also intended to help ensure compliance with practice
and regulatory review requirements” (IFAC, 2009, p. 63). Where a practice has failed to
comply, or has had a deficiency uncovered, they must undergo corrective actions or face
disciplinary actions. The IFAC (2009) recommend that “the firm develop policies and
procedures that will permit it to address all deficiencies the monitoring program detects
(except those that are trivial or inconsequential). It should consider whether these
deficiencies indicate structural flaws in the quality control system or demonstrate non-
compliance by a particular partner or staff member” (IFAC, 2009, p. 67).
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Previous research has focused on the regulatory areas of accounting such as auditing but
with more small companies becoming exempt from audit because of changes in the
threshold (Kenny, 2005), accounting firms are earning a higher percentage of their fees from
non-regulatory work (Alexander, 2003; Bather and Burnaby, 2006). Auditing is not the
profitable and prestigious product it once was (Rezaee, 2004; Doran, 2006). It is now
common that audit clients form a small percentage of a firm’s total clientele (POB, 2006).
The independent supervisory body in the UK, The Professional Oversight Board (POB), notes
that the number of registered audit firms is gradually declining (POB, 2011). This has
resulted in a greater focus on how the firms provide these non-audit services although they
are not part of regulatory monitoring.
Previous research in the areas of service quality and monitoring raise a number of issues in
the accounting context. There are considerable costs associated with the supervision and
monitoring procedures (CARB, 2011) and this is funded by the firms.
Do these costs and those borne by the firms in implementing adequate quality assurance
systems justify the benefits gained by the firm’s clients? When this research is analysed,
these matters leave questions that can be best answered by the firms themselves.
2.2 Historical Monitoring
Quality assurance monitoring of accountancy firms began as far back as the mid-1970s in
the United States (USA) and became mandatory there from 1988 (Alkafaji, 2007). This
monitoring focused on regulatory audits and was conducted through a peer-review program
that was overseen by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) (Gunny
and Zhang, 2009; Hilary and Lennox, 2005). Following high profile corporate governance
failures, an independent regulatory body, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB), was set up to oversee the industry which replaced the role of the AICPA (Gunny
and Zhang, 2009). The change came about because of concerns that the self-regulation had
failed (Hilary and Lennox, 2005).
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There has been much debate about the merits of peer review and independent regulation
(Collins and Shultz, 1995; Gunny and Zhang, 2009; Hilary and Lennox, 2005; Lennox and
Pittmann, 2010; Russell and Armitage, 2006; Van de Poel et al, 2009). In Europe the
European Union (EU) 8th directive in 2006 required each country to create an effective
system of public oversight and be governed by non-practitioners (Van de Poel et al, 2009).
The directive also gave the public oversight authorities the ultimate responsibility for the
approval and registering of audit firms, quality control procedures, continuous education
and disciplinary measures (Van de Poel, 2009).
Most countries have since established some form of monitoring procedures (Alkafaji, 2007).
The IFAC has members in one hundred and twenty seven countries worldwide (IFAC, 2011a)
including some of the PABs in Ireland (IFAC, 2011b). The IFAC, in its 2004 Statements of
Membership Obligations (SMOs), stipulated that its member bodies establish quality
assurance reviews (IFAC, 2004, SMO1). In Ireland and the United Kingdom (UK), the
accounting firms are licensed and monitored by their member body which in turn is
supervised by the independent body. In the UK the body is the POB and in Ireland it is
IAASA, set up by the Government in 2003. Canning and O`Dwyer describe this system as
‘delegated self-regulation’ (Canning & O`Dwyer, 2001)
Alkafaji identifies that the thirty three countries in his research have the same key objectives
in that they want to ensure that there is a minimum criterion of quality in meeting
professional standards, that credibility is added to the accounting profession and that
corrective actions and education are encouraged (Alkafaji, 2007, p 648). There is evidence
that firms receiving a negative review are more likely to lose clients (Bedard et al, 2008).
This evidence is based on audit reviews but there is a lack of substantial research into the
effects of a negative review of non-audit services. The POB finds that a firm could have a
negative review from a regulatory monitoring visit but receive a satisfactory assessment
from a non-regulatory visit (POB, 2010).
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Alkafaji’s research also suggests that a review conducted every three years is the most
effective. He found that a three year cycle gives a reasonable length of time between
reviews but still keeps the quality control issues on the agenda (Alafaji, 2007). This is backed
up by Porter whose earlier research identifies that anything less than a five year cycle would
be inappropriate (Porter, 1997). The EU 8th Directive requires that firms are monitored at
least once every six years (POB, 2006).
2.3 Defining & Measuring Quality
Quality has become an issue for all businesses since the early 1950s. Many books have been
written on the subject and industry has attempted to model itself around quality (Wright,
2009). Wright (2009) notes that, “Quality control focuses on developing and maintaining a
service or product that is economical, useful and satisfactory to the customer”. Service
quality is difficult to measure (Duff, 2009; Quester and Romaniuk, 1997) and is seen to
reflect the difference between client expectations and perceptions of actual performance
(Berry, et al, 1990). Lim (2008) states “Few studies have sought to give a comprehensive
account of the dynamics in managing quality assurance systems” (Lim, 2008, p 127). The fact
that accounting services are specialised means that the general public do not find it easy to
measure the quality of service they receive (Porter, 1997). Dean (2002, p. 402), cites
Rimmer (1994, p. 83) who notes that “there are no generally accepted measures of quality.
Frequently used measures include surveys of users, changes in input, the range or number
of output and performance indicators such as a systematic assessment of user complaints”.
Dean (2002, p. 402) further cites Hall and Rimmer (1994, p. 456) who state when talking
about quality that it is only used in an economic sense. This is found to be true because the
aim of providing a quality service is client satisfaction and therefore retention (Landrum et
al, 2009; Van de Poel, 2009). Therefore, how service quality is measured is important, as it
will provide information to the firm regarding the effectiveness of their system and
recommend improvements which will lead to increased revenue (Alkafaji, 2007).
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The PABs tend to use the same approach to measuring quality regardless of the firm size
(POB, 2006) although ACCA claim not to prescribe set procedures for firms to follow, and
that it distinguishes between small and large practices when conducting reviews(ACCA,
2009). The reviewers approach to measuring a firm’s quality control standards focuses on
whether the firm’s quality control system is adequate and if so, is it complying with the
system (Hilary & Lennox, 2005).
Although all countries share common objectives in that they want to ensure that the quality
of services provided are at a certain standard, the measurement techniques vary in respect
of reviewer, frequency of visit, scope, confidentially of review reports, public representation
and funding (Porter, 1997; Alkafaji, 2007). There does not appear to be a international
agreement or guidance on minimum standards (Alkafaji, 2007)
2.4 Benefits of Monitoring
A firm that implements an effective quality control system can be reasonably assured that
their services are carried out in accordance with professional standards (Schmutte and
Thieling, 2010). This indicates that a firm should not approach quality reviews with a sense
of fear or apprehension, but welcome them as they could further improve service quality
(Bedard, et al, 2008). ACCA (2009, p. 3)have a Quality Checked (QC) scheme which aims to
“encourage firms to adopt best practice procedures in relation to standards and quality
controls, and also help them maintain a competitive edge in the marketplace”. Allen (2011,
p. 57) concurs with this, stating “Firms with effective quality control systems not only
continuously improve the quality of their services and comply with professional standards;
significant additional benefits abound”. Evidence also indicates that substandard
performance is linked to poor results from quality reviews or an absence of quality reviews
(Thomas, et al, 1998 cited in Alkafaji, 2007; Hilary and Lennox, 2005). Where poor standards
are identified it is important to address them and learn from the experience as is
acknowledged by Roybark (2006, p. 128) “Learning from our mistakes is essential, both
individually, and collectively, as a profession”.
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The quality of service provided can give competitive advantage in limited geographical areas
where there are many firms offering similar services (Hoffman and Bateson, 1997 cited in
Saxby, et al, 2004 p.75). Saxby (2004, p. 75) further contends that “higher levels of customer
satisfaction lead, in turn, to repeat business and ultimately to higher levels of income. Thus,
accounting firms should be concerned with maximizing service quality”. Increasing the
quality of services provided can also preserve long term relationships with clients (Landrum,
et al, 2009). One participant in Allen’s (2011, p. 57) research remarked “If you have quality
and you deliver advice that is timely and accurate, you will make money”.
There is evidence that firms, although sceptical at first, do find monitoring an opportunity to
improve their profitability and performance (Illingworth, 2004). There is a perception that
participating in a quality review program will improve the quality of service being provided
and that that participation itself represents a commitment to quality (Bedard et al, 2008).
Previous research conducted in the area of regulated services in the US, concluded that
reviews are perceived to improve the quality of work and service provided (Alkafaji, 2007).
Reliability and assurance are identified as the areas that firms should concentrate on when
wanting to improve service quality and customer satisfaction (Saxby et al, 2004).
Maintaining quality is a challenge but by meeting that challenge, a firm can enhance its
image and reputation, avoid lawsuits and abide by professional standards (Hull, 1992).
2.5 Impact of Quality Assurance Monitoring on Firms
Previous research has shown that clients prefer to use the services of a high quality audit
firm (Lennox and Pittman, 2010). Landrum et al (2009) finds that quality of service has a
major influence on customer’s satisfaction and on their continuing to make use of the
service. How does a firm provide the service that a client expects, and does the quality
control systems that satisfies the regulators reviews, provide for their clients’ needs or is it
excessive and a burden? Russell and Armitage (2006) cited Ehlen and Welker (1996) who
surveyed firms in America and established that the majority of firms did not find that the
reviews were cost-beneficial. Although they felt that the reviews were fair, smaller firms
especially, found that the reviews were not cost-beneficial and that the three year review
cycle was too short (Russell and Armitage, 2006).
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The review process has the greatest impact on small firms (Porter, 1997). Bedard et al
(2008) cited Read et al (2004) who interviewed partners of small firms who had stopped
engaging in audits and found that “increased oversight, liability insurance costs, and scrutiny
were primary reasons for resignations” (Bedard et al, 2008, p 208)
A firms system of quality control can be split into three levels. The first level is how it
reviews its own system, the second level is how the client judges its level of service and the
third level is independent verification by means of monitoring (Nwankwo, 2000). Nwankwo
(2000) does acknowledge that firms usually implement quality systems around accreditation
schemes or as in the accounting field, the monitoring process. Implementing a quality
system to fit a monitoring process will increase bureaucracy for the firm (Doran, 2006). The
availability of modern information technology has decreased the time needed to prepare
financial statements, but this additional time is now spent complying with quality assurance
regulations (Doran, 2006). Unlike the regulatory monitoring, where disciplinary actions will
happen if breaches are found, quality assurance monitoring is more education based and
this shows that the monitoring bodies have an awareness of the unequal impact of
monitoring on small firms compared to larger ones (Porter, 1997).
2.6 Benefits of Quality Assurance Monitoring for the Client
When the general public engages an accountant they expect the work to be carried out with
integrity and that the person is competent to carry out that work (POB, 2010). The same
POB (2010) report finds that the general public, who use external accountants, are not really
aware of the monitoring procedures their accountant is subject to and have little
understanding of how the system works.
Clients have an expectation about the quality of work they should receive and if they
perceive that the performance of the accountant has not matched or exceeded their
expectation, a negative gap is the result (Saxby et al, 2004). Performance that matches
expectation produces satisfaction and should it exceed expectation customer fulfilment
increases (Saxby et al, 2004). Saxby et al (2004) cite Cronin and Taylor (1992) and Teas
(1994) whose research finds that on its own, perceived performance is an accurate indicator
of service quality.
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2.7 Legal Term ‘Accountant’
Under the current law, there is no legal protection for the term ‘accountant’ in Ireland
(IAASA, 2006). This means that anyone can call themselves an accountant and provide
services to the general public. Such people are not monitored in any way. “Persons
providing accountancy services in the state who are not members of any accountancy body
are not currently subject to any form of regulation or supervision” (IAASA, 2006, p 4). This
IAASA consultation paper invited interested parties to comment on the issue of legal
protection for the term accountant.
One response came from The Competition Authority (CA) which argues that “any system of
statutory regulation of a title automatically creates barriers to entry and market rigidities
which can have negative effects for consumers of the services” (The Competition Authority,
2006, p 2). The C A further contends that regulation of the profession could result in
increased prices to consumers but without any actual improvement in quality (The
Competition Authority, 2006). The CA bases its argument on a report by the Review Group
on Auditing in 2000. They cited this review which noted “there is no evidence for public
demand for such a protection, and no evidence of abuse of the term has come to the
attention of the department” (The Competition Authority, 2006, p 5). There is evidence,
however to suggest that professionals feel that it takes up to six years post-qualification
experience before one feels fully competent (Cheetham and Chivers, 2001).
The ICPAI, which is one of the nine PABs that are under the supervision of IAASA, also
submitted a response to the consultation paper. They argue that the public are unaware
that persons using the title ‘accountant’ may not have any formal qualifications and are not
subject to any form of regulation and this backs earlier research by Porter (1997)(ICPAI,
2006a). ICPAI claim that because people who have no formal qualifications or are
unregulated are permitted to provide services, it undermines the whole process of
monitoring. Members of the public who are using such individuals are not safeguarded in
the same way as they would be with professional accountants (ICPAI, 2006).
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Accounting guidelines are constantly updated and ICPAI, along with all the other PABs,
recognises this and ensures that their members undergo Continuous Professional
Development/Education (CPD/CPE) (ICPAI, 2006a). They also point out that the anti-money
laundering legislation was extended in 2003 to include ‘accountants, auditors and tax
advisors’. The fact that the term ‘accountant’ is not defined legally makes it difficult to
identify who is under this legislation (ICPAI, 2006a). ICPAI does not want to restrict an
unqualified person from providing services or for the public to be restricted if they want to
engage such a person. However it does want the unqualified person prevented from using
the term ‘accountant’ and seeks to ensure that the public are aware of the fact that he/she
is not professionally qualified (ICPAI, 2006a).
The ICAI, another one of the nine Bodies under the supervision of IAASA, also produced a
response to the consultation paper and largely agreed with the ICPAI response (ICAI, 2006).
They pointed out that as IAASA are responsible for “promoting adherence to high
professional standards in the auditing and accounting profession” (www.iaasa.ie). They are
open to criticism because people acting as accountants who are not members of one of the
nine PABs are outside of their scope (ICAI, 2006). The value of membership of one of the
PABs and being able to use the PABs designated letters is acknowledged by Cowton (2009)
who is of the opinion that as the member gains from the PABs reputation, the body must
protect that reputation by regulating the member. ICAI also make the point that because
accountants are performing less statutory work such as audits, there is a temptation for
accountants to resign their membership from their member body and practice in the
unregulated and unsupervised sector (ICAI, 2006).
IAASA produced a feedback paper in 2007 based on responses to the 2006 consultation
paper. It included recommendations to the government that the term accountant should be
restricted to certain persons (IAASA, 2007). They assert that members of the public will
assume that anyone who describes themselves as an accountant will have completed their
exams, gained their qualifications after the necessary work experience and is subject to
monitoring (IAASA, 2007).
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This assertion appears to back up the view of Collins and Schultz (1995) who state that
accountants owe primary allegiance to the “using “public. IAASA (2007) identifies risks to
members of the public who engage non-qualified persons which could result in financial loss
by acting on incorrect advice and not having any means of recourse as such a person is not a
member of one of the nine supervised PABs. IAASA (2007) contends that such risks run
contrary to the principles of the 2003 companies act, and IAASAs own core principle of
enhancing public confidence in the accounting profession. Opposing the CAs assertion that
there is no abuse of the term accountant, IAASA state that they have had complaints from
members of the public regarding persons whom they were led to believe were professional
accountants but in fact were not (IAASA, 2007). It is recognised that unqualified persons
have a cost advantage over regulated accountants and that is counter-intuitive (IAASA,
2007).
2.8 Research Questions
When the author concluded the literature review, a number of areas and issues were
identified as needing to be addressed. It was felt that by putting the following questions to
accountants and accounting firms, a greater understanding of these issues would be
obtained. This would also lead to answers regarding the central aim of this research which is
to find out if the quality assurance monitoring process adds value to the services provided
by accountants or is it just an additional cost to the firm.
Q1: How often have members received monitoring reviews?
Research has indicated that the effectiveness of monitoring is at least partly dependant on
the frequency of the monitoring visit (Porter, 1997; Alafaji, 2007). This question aims to
determine how often the PABs in Ireland assert they perform monitoring visits and
investigate if it is an expectation they are living up to or just compliance. ICAI have indicated
that they have not been meeting visit targets as their resources have been concentrated on
a review of certain financial institutions over the past few years CARB, 2011).
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Q2: How are these reviews structured?
Each of the PABs has their own methods of reviewing their members. ACCA has a clear
separation of quality control from regulatory audit monitoring and offer the incentive of
their QC seal of approval (ACCA, 2009). This contrasts with ICAI who perform regulatory and
quality assurance monitoring together (CARB, 2011). This question will examine these
methods and compare them with each other and with best practice.
Q3: Do members feel that the reviews are beneficial?
There is little research to show how beneficial the firms feel that the monitoring process is
to them. Previous research has focused on data collected from the users of professional
accountants (POB, 2010). This question will explore the ways in which accountants feel that
reviews are beneficial and will also examine if they feel the reviews improve the way they
provide their services to their clients or do they believe that they have already provided an
acceptable level of service quality.
Q4: How does implementing a quality system impact on a firm?
This question will examine how the quality assurance monitoring process impacts on the
firm. It will consider the costs involved and the time that it takes to implement a system as
previous research indicates that it may not be cost beneficial (Russell and Armitage, 2006). It
will also examine if the implementation of the firm’s quality system increases profitability as
previous literature has asserted (Allen, 2011).
Q5: Does the member feel that the client benefits from the firm having a quality system?
This question will ask the accountant if they believe that the client benefits from the
member being monitored. The 2010 POB report states that the general public do not
understand the monitoring process or what it involves. It will also probe if the additional
cost of implementing a system, which satisfies the firm’s member body, can be justified in
the additional service benefit the client receives.
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Q6: Does the member believe that the term ‘accountant’ should be legally protected, and if
so why?
The only areas required by law to be monitored, in terms of quality assurance, are audit and
investment business. The raising of the audit exemption limit has meant that a much larger
portion of a firm’s income is coming from non-regulatory work (Alexander, 2003; Bather and
Burnaby, 2006). This work can be performed by anyone and they do not have to be a
member of a PAB. They can also legally call themselves an accountant. This question will
ask accountants, who are members of the PABs, if the public are able to distinguish between
a qualified professional accountant and someone who merely describes themselves as an
accountant. It will also examine if it is beneficial for the accounting industry to have such
services provided unregulated.
2.9 Conclusion
Since the introduction of IAASA in 2003 under the Companies Act, the role of the
accountancy firm has changed in that the work they carry out is now supervised and they
are answerable for the quality of the work that they perform. The 2003 act also raised the
audit exemption limit for small companies (Kenny, 2005). This exemption was further raised
in 2006 (CPA, 2006b). The raising of these exemption limits has had the effect of lowering
the volume of statutory work being carried out by practices. The Institute of Chartered
Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) stated to practitioners in their 2003 report “You
should aim for up to 60 per cent of income to come from consultancy work or other value
added services” (ICAEW, 2003, p. 16) The POB recognises that the PABs monitoring
arrangements were established to protect public interest and provide guidance to members
who undertake non-regulated work (POB, 2010, p1). The monitoring procedures carried out
by the PABs aim to fulfil both these objectives.
Research previously carried out has been focused on the viewpoint of the PABs and the
clients (POB, 2010; Alkafaji, 2007; Saxby, et al, 2004), and also on the quality of regulated
audit work (Porter, 1997; Ramirez, 2005; Lennox and Pittman, 2010).
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This research points to the fact that monitoring of audit firms has improved audit quality
(Bedard et al, 2008; Alkafaji, 2007).
There is not a lot of available research on how the non-audit practices, both large and small,
view current monitoring procedures as identified by Alkafaji (2007). This is an area that is
relevant because of the increasing amount of non-statutory work and services currently
carried out by practices. Clients also want their accountant to be knowledgeable, able to
answer questions and know that they are familiar with ever changing rules and regulations
(Saxby et al, 2004). A great deal of this knowledge is gained in the workplace (Cheetham and
Chivers, 2001). The public more than ever have a clear interest in the quality of financial
reporting (Loft et al, 2005).
There would of course be no need for any regulation or monitoring, if accountants acted
altruistically and put the good of society and community ahead of their own or client
interests, but this is not realistic (Canning and O`Dwyer, 2001).
Ethical education has now become part of professional accountancy examinations in most
countries (Waldmann, 2000). Cowton (2009) questions “whether being ethical ‘pays’ in
financial terms; and whether formal codes are useful in promoting ethical behaviour”
(Cowton, 2009, p 177). His research concludes that the challenge for the PABs is to be
perceived as a profession which holds a valuable technical and ethical endeavour deserving
its considerable rewards and not seen as a conspiracy against society that seeks to justify its
considerable rewards through a smokescreen of ethics (Cowton, 2009, p187).
The monitoring review procedures that the PABs have in place may be very credible;
however there can never be a flawless system (Hilary and Lennox, 2005; Porter, 1997;
Bratton, 2003; Bather and Burnaby, 2006). The question will always be asked, why do
failures still happen? Perhaps the question should be what failures have been avoided as a
result of the monitoring that is in place (Porter, 1997). Nwamkwo, (2000), notes that being
able to win quality accreditation does not ensure a true commitment to quality and he
further quotes from an unknown source
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“You can satisfy every quality standard and even reach the Holy Grail of Six Sigma without having
a quality organisation. It is much better to view quality certification measures not as a panacea
but a pilgrimage, a journey not a destination”
(anonymous cited by Nwamkwo, 2000, p 95)
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Chapter Three: Methodology
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter the author outlines the methodology used in order to find out if the quality
assurance monitoring processes used by the PABs within the accounting industry in Ireland
adds value to the service provided by the accountant to the client, or does it just add
additional costs to the firm.
The chapter will describe the various methods available to collect data and the advantages
and disadvantages of each. It will identify which method was chosen and give a justification
for that choice.
3.2 Research Philosophy
Two of the main research philosophies that researchers can adopt are positivism and
interpretivism. The researcher’s choice of philosophy will reflect how they think about the
development of knowledge and contain important assumptions about the way in which they
view the world (Saunders et al, 2009).
The positivist philosophy is like that of a natural scientist. Saunders et al (2009) quotes
Remenyi et al (1998) who states that the positivist researcher prefers working with an
observable social reality which will result in law-like generalisations (Saunders et al, 2009).
What Saunders is saying is that positivism is a scientific approach where data is quantifiable
and there is little or no room for observation. Critics of the positivism philosophy will say
that the highly structured research design imposes constraints on the results and that it fails
to examine people’s perceptions (Collis and Hussey, 2000). It was following criticism of
positivism that the interpretivism was developed as an alternative explanation.
The interpretive philosophy is where the researcher has to “enter the social world of the
research subjects and understand their world from their point of view” (Saunders et al,
2009, p. 116). Interpretivism makes the assumption that the social world is constantly
changing and that the researcher is a part of this. Saunders also identifies that the adoption
of an emphatic stance is crucial to the interpretivist philosophy.
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The author adopted an interpretive philosophy to this research. It was felt that it was the
most suitable because it gave a flexible approach to collecting the data. It also takes into
account the changing business environment which is important as there are regular changes
in the accounting industry where accounting standards are constantly updated (Saunders et
al, 2009). The interpretivist philosophy allows for the details of the monitoring process to be
understood and an understanding of the reality working behind them (Remenyi et al, 2003)
whereas previous literature from Alkafaji (2007), Duff (2009) and others were from a
positivist approach. These approaches produced results but didn’t explore the reasons
behind the results. By adopting an interpretive philosophy, the author hoped to expand on
the findings of previous literature.
3.3 Research Approach
There are two main approaches to research; deductive and inductive. The deductive
approach involves the collection of quantitative data using a highly structured mechanism. It
emphasises the necessity of selecting samples of sufficient size in order to generalise
conclusions. The inductive approach involves the collection of qualitative data and has a
more flexible structure which permits changes of research emphasis as the research
progresses. There is also less concern with the need to generalise and a realisation that the
researcher is part of the research process (Saunders et al, 2009).
The inductive approach was adopted for this thesis as it was felt that it would give a much
richer insight into quality assurance monitoring than a deductive approach. This approach
allowed the flexibility that the author felt was needed in order to explore the research area
without the need to produce quantitative data.
3.4 Research Focus
All research fits in to one of these broad areas: exploratory, descriptive and explanatory.
Research that fits into the exploratory classification has been designed to explore opinions
on the research area. It is useful to gain a better understanding of the area especially where
no previous research has been done (Hair et al, 2007).
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Descriptive research is used to depict an accurate profile of persons, events or situations. It
can be used as a forerunner to an exploratory research (Robson, 2002). Data gained usually
describes the characteristics of the research area (Hair et al, 2007).
An explanatory study is one which examines casual relationships between variables
(Saunders et al, 2009). It aims to clarify why there is a relationship between two parts of a
problem and to bring an understanding of that problem (Collis and Hussey, 2000)
The research focus adopted for this dissertation will be exploratory. This is because the
author aims to gain an insight into the area of the quality assurance monitoring of
accounting firms. The exploratory approach is useful as there has not been substantial
previous research in this area although Doran (2006) did conduct some interviews with
various organisations but not with accountants. There is also an element of a descriptive
focus as the author describes how changes in the regulatory monitoring procedures have
affected the scope of quality assurance monitoring in the accounting industry.
3.5 Data Collection Methods
There are many methods that a researcher can use to gather data. The most common are
questionnaires and interviews. Other methods of collecting data include case studies, focus
groups and observation.
Observation
Observation involves the researcher watching the actions and behaviour of the people who
are central to their study. The researcher then records what they have seen and analyses
the results. They then describe and interpret what they have observed (Robson, 2002).
Focus Groups
Focus groups are similar to interviews but the difference is that all the participants are
interviewed together. The difficulty with focus groups is logistics; it is difficult to get a time
and venue that is suitable to all the participants.
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Case Study
The ‘case’ in a case study is the situation, group, individual or organisation that the
researcher is interested in. It is a strategy rather than a method and is focused on a
particular or specific case (Robson, 2002).
Questionnaires
A questionnaire is a data collection technique where each respondent is required to answer
the same questions in a predetermined order (Saunders et al, 2009). Questionnaires are
widely used and while they are easy to use they can be difficult to design. They can be
administered by interview or by self-administration through the internet or by postal
response.
Interviews
An interview is probably best described as a purposeful discussion between two people
(Kahn and Cannell, 1957). There are three main structures that can be adopted when using
an interview; structured, semi-structured and un-structured.
A structured interview is where a pre-determined questionnaire is used and the data
collected is quantifiable (Saunders et al, 2009).
A semi-structured interview is where the interviewer has a list of themes and questions to
be covered but they may vary from interview to interview. The order of questions may vary
and some questions may be omitted if they are not deemed necessary. Additional questions
may also be added if it is considered necessary (Saunders et al, 2009).
An unstructured interview is an informal interview where there is no predetermined list of
questions to work through. The interviewer must have a clear idea about the area that they
are discussing. The interviewee has the opportunity to talk freely about the topic area
(Saunders et al, 2009). An unstructured interview is an in-depth discussion which requires
an experienced interviewer and, as a research tool, is not an easy option for a novice
(Robson, 2002).
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Data Collection Method Adopted
The author decided that in order to get a deeper understanding of the quality assurance
monitoring process in the accounting industry, semi structured interviews would be the
most suitable rather than questionnaires. Logistic problems meant that it was impossible to
perform a focus group and the author felt that individuals would speak more freely in a one
to one interview situation rather than a group setting. Structured interviews were not
chosen because the author felt that they were too inflexible. The unstructured interview
approach was not chosen because the author wanted some control over the direction of the
interviews and felt that the unstructured approach could drift off into tangents that would
not be relevant to the study.
By adopting the semi structured approach, a richer insight can be gained from the
interviews as it allows the interviewer to be flexible. The author felt that semi structured
interviews were suitable as the perceptions of the interviewees were being sought and the
data is subjective and qualitative. By using semi structured interviews, questions can be
open-ended and the order in which they are put to the interviewee can be flexible so that
questions may be added or omitted as necessary (Hair et al, 2007). It was felt that as each
interviewee has their own unique opinion, this method would allow those opinions to be
expressed and the reasoning behind them given.
3.6 Profile of Interviewees
When the secondary data collection was completed, it was decided by the author to
complete semi structured in depth interviews with accountants who were members of the
three largest PABSs. These three are ICAI, ACCA and ICPAI. Accountants working in a range
of firm sizes throughout Ireland were contacted. Permission for six interviews was then
secured with firms who were all members of these three PABS.
The six interviewees were spread across four counties and three provinces. This ensured
that there was no geographical bias.
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The interviewees represented a range of firm sizes. One person belonged to a firm that had
more than fifty partners, two belonged to firms that had between ten and fifty partners and
the other three were from firms that had less than ten partners. The six interviewees from
the firms are referred to in chapter four as interviewee AF06, AF07, AF08, AF09, AF10 and
AF11.
The author also decided that it would give the study greater insight if representatives of the
three biggest PABs, to whom the six firm interviewees were members, were given the
opportunity to be interviewed and provide their perspective on the subject. All three PABs
were contacted and two agreed to provide representatives for an interview but the third
PAB declined the opportunity. The two representatives from the PABs are referred to in
chapter four as PAB01 and PAB02.
A final interview was then sought from IAASA and Mr Ian Drennan, Chief Executive Officer
(CEO), kindly agreed to be interviewed. Mr Drennan also agreed to waive his anonymity.
3.7 Data Analysis
The interviews were first transcribed so that the data could then be analysed. They were
then categorised so that each area could be individually addressed. This allowed for the data
to be systematically and rigorously analysed (Baxter et al, 2006). Unnecessary data was
removed ensuring that the remaining information could be specifically linked to the
research questions. This information was then reorganised so that relationships and
patterns were recognised.
3.8 Limitations of the Study
As with all research, there were limitations with the methodology chosen. Time constraints
meant that a limited number of interviews were possible. The interviews were recorded and
this can sometimes inhibit honest responses (Bell, 2010) but it was hoped to overcome this
limitation by allowing the interviewees to remain anonymous. Those interviewed also
received a transcript of the interview for approval before the interview data was used in the
research.
30
There is also a limitation in that interviewer bias may have influenced the quality of the
data. When one researcher conducts all the interviews, there is a possibility that any
interviewer bias may go undetected because the bias is consistent throughout the
interviews (Bell, 2010).
3.9 Conclusion
Following the collection of secondary data by means of a literature review, semi structured
interviews were the chosen method for the collection of the primary data.
A pilot interview was conducted in order to test the recording equipment and to allow some
assessment of the questions and make the necessary adjustments.
This research is interpretive and exploratory which allows it to be flexible and take into
account differing views and perceptions. This gives a more in-depth study into quality
assurance monitoring of accounting firms.
Nine interviews were conducted and the findings of these are presented in chapter four.
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Chapter Four: Findings
4.1 Introduction
This chapter outlines the findings of the primary research. The central aim of this study was
to discover if the quality assurance monitoring process in the accounting industry in Ireland
adds value to the service received by the client or does it merely add additional costs to the
firm. In order to answer this, the chapter contains three sections with the three tiers of the
accounting industry all having their opinions expressed. This is done by exploring each of the
issues that were identified in the literature and leads to a conclusion on the central aim.
4.2 The Accountants View
This section deals with the views and perceptions of the six professional accountants
interviewed. Each interviewee was asked six questions in order to gain their individual
insight into the monitoring process.
Frequency of visits
All the interviewees were in agreement that the frequency of visits was decided by the PABs
on a risk basis. All firms involved in statutory audits were due a visit at least every six years.
Firms that are auditing PIEs would expect a visit at least every three years. Two of those
interviewed felt that because of the level of their investment and audit business, they would
expect to be reviewed every two years or even annually.
All the respondents, except one, have had a visit in the previous six years. The one, who had
not, has not received a visit in at least ten years. This respondent (AF11) did point out that
they do have an independent firm come in every year to conduct a review of their files and
when they fill in their annual application form to their PAB, they are asked if they have had
such a review. The respondent felt that this might satisfy their PAB but they are still quite
perplexed as to why they have not received a visit in such a long period of time. They are
certainly not being monitored within the Statutory Audit Directive Regulations which
requires that all audit firms receive a monitoring visit at least every six years.
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Two of the other respondents also expressed the opinion that they were overdue a visit
because of the nature of the business that they conduct and the clients they possess. When
asked why they believed that this was not happening as it should, they both responded that
they believed it was because the ongoing investigation into the banking sector was taking
up much of the time and resources of their PAB.
Structure of the Visits
All the interviewees stated that they have an annual return to complete which provides
information about the firm and its clients. This return is not part of the monitoring process
but it was felt that the PABs use this information as part of their risk analysis decision
making procedure. One respondent (AF06) stated that the annual return gives the PAB a
‘flavour ‘of the firm.
Firms are given about one month’s notice that they are to receive a visit. Although this may
seem like quite a long period of notice, it was pointed out that if a firms systems and
procedures were not in order there would not be enough time to put them right. A visit
would last from as little as one day for a small practice to two weeks for one of the very big
firms.
There is an opening meeting when the reviewers arrive and following this they will select a
number of client files and review them. The files are selected at random but always include
those that are deemed high risk, examples being solicitors or credit unions. They also do a
review of back up material like employees CPD and PII. After the review is concluded the
reviewers will sit down with the firm and discuss their findings. The firm has an opportunity
to give its views on the results and any issues that have arisen. The firm receives a written
report after the reviewers leave. The report outlines any issues arising and makes
recommendations which the firm must respond to. The firm has to come up with an action
plan in order to deal with the reviewers’ recommendations and then implement it. The
more serious issues must be dealt with and less serious issues are at the firm’s discretion
although they are nevertheless recommendations. The firm is awarded a grade and this will
help decide how long it will be until the next visit.
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Benefits of Monitoring Visits to the Firm
All interviewees felt that the monitoring process and visits were beneficial. The attitude of
all respondents was very positive towards visits. One respondent (AF06) put it like this,
“They are beneficial because I think there’s no point in having a system if there isn’t some form of
monitoring. There’s no point having a regulatory system that’s not monitored. It’s like having the
rules without having the police to enforce it.” (AF06)
The feeling was that the visits were not adversarial and were constructive which is in
agreement to previous research by Alkafaji (Alkafaji, 2007). The interviewees felt that the
fact that they know that their files are subject to possible inspection keeps them on their
toes and ensures that they do not let quality standards slip.
One respondent (AF08) did state that benefits were limited because the firm does not
always gain new knowledge from having files reviewed. Another respondent (AF11) stated
that because they hadn’t been visited in the last ten years, they didn’t feel any benefit from
the monitoring process.
Overall it was felt that the monitoring process and visits were beneficial but it doesn’t
guarantee that the firm provides a quality service.
“Following regulatory monitoring on its own does not ensure that you have a good quality system
but it does assist.” (AF07)
Impact of Implementing a Quality Control System
There were varying responses regarding the impact of implementing a quality assurance
system. Larger firms did not feel the same impact as smaller ones. This is because the larger
firms have annual reviews both internally and from their international partners as well as
the PABs monitoring procedures. The feeling amongst these firms was that their own
monitoring reviews were quite stringent and resulted in lessening the impact of the PAB
visit.
“We have controls and annual reviews so the impact of the external monitoring is not huge to be
quite honest. In terms of quality assurance the external monitoring would have a minimum impact.”
(AF08)
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Their quality systems to meet the demands of their own reviews were more than adequate
to meet the demands of the PABs. Their quality systems were part of the firm’s culture with
only minor improvements or adjustment ever being made.
The smaller firms found the implementation of a quality system to be time consuming,
especially at the initial set-up. They were all in agreement that once it was set up it had a
positive impact and was easy to maintain.
The initial set-up involved the changing of the old habits and putting more emphasis on
routine, technical know-how and knowledge. Although it may be time consuming to
implement in the beginning, all respondents felt that it makes the firm more efficient and in
the long term it is time saving rather than time consuming.
One respondent (AF06) identified its aim in having a quality system is to reduce risk.
“The impact on the firm is to ensure that we can reduce the risks that we face as a business.” (AF06)
All of the respondents were in agreement that there is a cost in implementing and having a
quality assurance system.
“You can’t have quality systems, procedures and controls without having costs.” (AF06)
There was general agreement that although it is a regulatory requirement to have a quality
control system, it is also a necessity and beneficial as opposed to just an additional cost. It
was felt that a quality system should not be seen as a block in doing business but rather as
adding benefit and value to the work that is conducted by the firm, although it wasn’t felt
that it increased the firm’s profitability. The quality system should be imbedded within the
firm’s culture and become second nature. Once that is achieved it flows naturally.
The consensus was that having a quality system did not depend on the PABs monitoring
process, but rather on the necessity of providing a value-added service to clients.
“I think that even if monitoring did not exist, there would be quality assurance processes one way or
the other.” (AF08)
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Benefits to the Client
All of the respondents agreed that the firm’s clients benefited from the firm having a quality
control system in place and by being monitored by their PAB. Benefits that were identified
included knowing the client’s compliance dates and providing correct and timely advice. In
general it was felt that a good working quality control system will add value to the service
being provided to the client.
Four of the six interviewed expressed the view that the client probably does not know that
the firm has a quality control system or that they are being monitored by their PAB which is
in keeping with the findings of the POB (POB, 2010). It was felt that the client expects a
quality service and that the person supplying that service is professional, competent and
possesses the required skills and qualifications. One respondent (AF07) said that the process
was probably invisible to the client.
“They expect a quality service and that’s a norm.” (AF07)
One respondent (AF07) expressed the view that clients felt that it was important that their
accountant had a good reputation or the firm was reputable and a member of one of the
PABs. Previous research indicates that clients prefer to use the services of high quality firms
(Lennox and Pittman, 2010).
All the interviewees saw a quality control system as benefiting the client although they did
not think that the client recognised that such a system or process existed.
Legal Term Accountant
The author questioned whether the term ‘accountant’ should be legally protected as the
term ’auditor’ is, because at the moment anyone can carry out any accountancy work, apart
from statutory audits, without qualifications and are unregulated and unsupervised or
monitored. The level of work that is available outside the regulatory process has been
enlarged with the increase of the audit exemption limit for companies.
Five of the six respondents felt very strongly that the term should be protected. One
respondent (AF06) stated that the nature of an accountant’s work, the trust nature and the
importance to the business community, means that not just anyone should be allowed to
set up and call themselves an accountant. It was pointed out that an unqualified person has
a cost advantage in that they do not have PAB membership fees, CPD training fees and may
not have PII. It was felt that accounting standards were being lowered by not having the
term protected.
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One respondent (AF09) felt that it was very unfair that when someone spends five or six
years of hard work and study qualifying to be an accountant in order to get a practice
certificate, they then find that there are people offering the same services without any cert
and that it is currently legal to do so.
All five respondents felt that the term accountant sits outside the monitoring and
supervisory process and that it should be defined with systems and procedures in place.
All five felt that those operating outside of the monitoring process should be brought into
the net and in order to do this the term should have legal status.
“Something should be done to get at those outside the profession to bring them in and regulate
them.” (AF11)
One respondent (AF07) felt that the fact that it is legal to practice and offer services to the
public outside of the monitoring process is seen as having a detrimental effect on the quality
assurance process
“It defeats the purpose of the regulatory process if some accountants are outside the monitoring
process.” (AF07)
One respondent (AF08) was less sure that the term should be legally protected. They felt
that it would be difficult to define because the scope of an accountants work is so wide.
“The legislature has decided on the bits that need regulating and if they are not saying that
bookkeepers need regulating then it would be illogical to try to protect a name that applies to
everyone from that bookkeeper to the FD (Financial Director) of a listed company.” (AF08)
This respondent also felt that members of the public in business would be able to
distinguish between a professionally qualified and regulated accountant and someone who
was practicing as an accountant but who was unqualified.
This is in contrast to the view of the other respondents. They felt that the general public do
not understand the difference between qualified and unqualified accountants and the
implications in terms of quality assurance and monitoring.
“I don’t think that they would understand that an unqualified accountant is not monitored.” (AF06)
“The big problem is that members of the public cannot distinguish between a professional
accountant and someone who just calls themselves an accountant. People have come to me and said
‘I always thought that he was an accountant’.” (AF10)
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4.3 The PABs View
This section deals with the views of the representatives of the two PABs who agreed to be
interviewed. These interviews were also semi-structured and included questions relating to
issues raised by the accountants in their interviews.
Frequency and Structure of Monitoring Visits
Both respondents were in agreement that about the frequency of visits to audit firms. Every
firm that is conducting statutory audits receives a monitoring visit at least every six years.
The visits are more frequent if the firm has not had a satisfactory outcome to their last visit.
Any firm that is involved in the audit of a PIE will receive a visit every three years. Both
respondents were confident that their respective PABs were complying with these
commitments and the author had not found any evidence to the contrary in the interviews
with practicing accountants from these two PABs.
The structure of the visits were quite similar with both PABs in that they have an initial
meeting at the beginning of the visit, then select audit files at random for review and have a
closing meeting to discuss the findings. Both PABs award a grade at the conclusion of the
visit but one body also awards a quality accreditation to firms whose quality assurance
system is deemed to have met a certain standard. This is an accreditation given by the PAB
itself and not part of the mandatory process.
Firms not performing well in the reviews receive follow-up actions which, depending on the
seriousness of the issue, could mean a re-review. Firms who have serious issues raised and
do not make the necessary improvements will have their practicing cert withdrawn.
Both respondents were in agreement that although the monitoring process is focused on
the regulatory area of auditing, non-audit firms can also receive reviews which are the same
process but not as stringent. The visits are not as frequent.
Benefits of Monitoring Visits for the Firm
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The monitoring review was described as a health check by one respondent (PAB02). It was
pointed out that sole practitioners can be especially isolated and the monitoring process
provides guidance. Having someone who has looked at hundreds of other practices come in
and review a firm’s systems and procedures can only be beneficial according to one of the
respondents. Both respondents felt that the process lowers risk for the firm and this is
important with litigation on the increase. It was recognised that firms complying with the
monitoring process may get more favourable PII quotations.
Impact of the Monitoring Visits for the Firm
Both respondents were in agreement that the quality assurance monitoring process and
visits placed a burden on the firm which agrees with previous findings from Bedard et al
(Bedard et al, 2008). One respondent (PAB01) stated that, from the firm’s perspective,
having someone coming in and checking their work is very intrusive. It is recognised as being
stressful for firms. It is also time consuming and costly for firms. In order to get a practicing
cert firms have to have systems in place in order to comply with the PABs rules. The cost of
the monitoring visits is also borne by the firms in an annual fee.
Benefits of Monitoring for the Client
Both respondents stated that the biggest benefit for the firm’s clients was the quality of the
service that they receive from a firm being monitored, although one respondent (PAB01)
felt that the clients may not appreciate that it is happening. Both respondents felt that
when a client engaged a member of their PABs, they could be assured that they would get a
high quality service because the member would have had to reach a certain standard in
order to pass the monitoring process.
Legal Term Accountant
Both respondents were very strongly in favour of the term accountant being legally
protected. They both felt that members of the public were being misled into believing that
when someone calls themselves an accountant that that person has passed exams and is
being regulated.
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One respondent (PAB02) stated that they did believe in freedom of choice and that if a
member of the public wanted to engage an unqualified person then that was fine, just as
long as they were able to differentiate between a qualified and an unqualified person.
Both respondents felt that the quality assurance monitoring process was not in any way
devalued by the fact that the term accountant wasn’t legally protected. They felt that the
process itself is important and valuable but did acknowledge that there was part of the
accounting industry outside the monitoring process and that there are unregulated
accountants wrongly offering services to the general public.
4.4 The View from IAASA
The author concluded the interview process by interviewing Ian Drennan, CEO of IAASA. The
interview was a semi-structured one and focused on the role of IAASA and its views on how
the PABs monitor their members.
The Role of IAASA
Drennan began by pointing out that under the 2003 Companies Act the PABs were
responsible for supervising and disciplining their members. That process is split into two
areas with investigation and discipline being one and the supervision of the quality of
members work being the other.
IAASA hold periodic meetings with the nine PABs under their remit and they assign a risk
profile to each body. The factors deciding the risk profile include the size of the body, nature
of issues identified previously and the general level of complexity of the body. IAASA meet
with the PABs on a quarterly basis typically and then do an on-site supervisory review where
they look at a number of areas of the PABs activities, so it is really like an audit of the PABs.
IAASA seek information from the PABs on an annual basis, some of which is published in
their annual report and some which is not published because it is confidential in nature.
IAASA also have ad-hoc meetings with the PABs if an issue arises or if a problem or
complaint is brought to their attention. Drennan stated that IAASA have greater interaction
with RABs than with those bodies that are prescribed but who do not have the audit
function.
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IAASA would like to visit the PABs on an annual basis but due to resource constraints this is
not possible so the bodies that are deemed a higher risk are visited more frequently.
If a member of the public makes a complaint to IAASA, they will try to ascertain if the
individual or firm being complained of is a member of a PAB. If they are not, then it outside
of IAASAs remit but if they are then IAASA will refer the complainant to the PAB so that the
PAB can deal with the matter through their investigation and disciplinary procedures. All the
PABs investigation and disciplinary procedures have been approved by IAASA. If the
complainant has already gone through the PABs procedures and is not happy with the
result, then IAASA will get involved and investigate it. If they find that the PAB involved has
not acted appropriately and within its own procedures and by-laws, then IAASA can issue a
statutory inquiry under section 23 of the 2003 Companies Act and if they find against the
PAB concerned, they can annul the decision that the body has made.
When asked if he felt that the clients of firms are aware that they have this process available
to them, Drennan replied that he thought, by and large, most clients are because it is be
stated in their engagement letter. He stated that in general the main issue is that they are
unhappy with the way a complaint has been dealt with.
IAASA have no direct interaction with members of the accounting profession, apart from
some interaction with the larger firms regarding policy and future developments rather than
regulation or co-role. Drennan stated that IAASA were unhappy with this model and have
been so for some time. He did state that implementing the Barnier proposals would result in
IAASA performing monitoring visits on firms conducting audits on PIEs rather than this being
done by the RABs as is currently the case. This would affect the top eight or ten firms and
could lead to public reports on these firms.
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Drennan conceded that a few of the PABs are struggling to meet their statutory
requirements in terms of the frequency of visitation to their members. He further stated
that although the six year cycle is a long time, it is a big improvement on the way it was
before that. Drennan said that IAASA would encourage PABs to look at the quality of
members work in non-regulated areas but that there was no statutory requirement for
them to do so.
Benefits for the Accounting Industry from the Establishment of IAASA
Drennan stated that members of the profession, practicing accountants, probably have not
seen any impact from the establishment of IAASA because IAASA was not established to
improve the accounting profession but to give confidence to the public as accountancy, and
particularly the audit, is a public interest activity. The role of IAASA is to ensure that the
PABs are doing their jobs properly by regulating their members correctly and if they are not,
then IAASA will take the appropriate action.
Practicing accountants have seen this in the monitoring visits. There is now more of a
robustness or rigor in the visits than there used to be. Small firms see the visits as being
much tougher and though they may not feel that this is a benefit to them, Drennan felt that
it was definitely beneficial to the clients who are using their services.
Drennan further stated that the role of IAASA was not to strengthen or underpin the
reputations of larger firms who have had their reputation damaged in recent years but to
enhance confidence in the profession as a whole by enhancing the way it’s regulated.
Do Monitoring Requirements improve the Quality of Service provided by firms
Drennan makes a distinction between larger firms and smaller firms. The larger firms have
their own internal monitoring which he feels was maybe more rigorous than the PABs but
smaller firms would feel the effects of the monitoring visits much more so and this has
certainly improved the quality of the services that they are providing. This is in agreement
with Porters findings that the review process has the greatest impact on small firms (Porter,
1997).
43
Drennan felt that because the larger firms have good internal monitoring processes, it does
not mean that the quality of their work is beyond reproach. Reports from other countries
where IAASAs international counterparts, such as the POB in the UK, who go directly into
firms say that there is room for improvement. Drennan states that if there is room for
improvement in other countries then he believes there is also room for improvement here.
Drennan conceded that firms providing non-regulatory services may never receive a
monitoring visit because the work that they are doing is low risk and the PABs do not have
the necessary resources. He said that this is not the perfect scenario but the reality is that
the audit function is the most important and that it is regulated.
Legal protection for the term Accountant
Drennan stated that the view of IAASA has been and remains that the term should be legally
protected. He said that people procuring the services of an accountant should be able to
rely on the fact that they have had the appropriate training. He acknowledged that
unqualified accountants are able to provide services cheaper than qualified ones but there
is no evidence to suggest that this is a major issue. There is no data to substantiate the scale
of the unregulated accounting industry.
Drennan felt that professional accountancy is still an attractive and resilient profession even
in the current difficult times. Accountants are still relatively well paid and having
professional qualifications opens doors. The audit qualification is not as attractive as it was
because of additional regulation and reputational risk but it is still reasonably well
compensated, especially at the top end of the market.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter examined the responses of the interviewees in the semi structured interviews.
The accountants who were interviewed were very positive about the quality assurance
monitoring process and felt that it was beneficial.
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The PABs interviewed place most of their emphasis and resources into the monitoring of
firms that are conducting audits. Their monitoring processes are in line with international
best practice in terms of visit frequency and the format of the visit.
IAASA would like to have their role extended so that they would be able to have more
interaction directly with firms as is the case in other countries and this may happen in the
near future if the Barnier proposals are implemented.
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Chapter Five: Conclusion
5.1 Introduction
This research was exploratory in nature and was undertaken to examine the quality
assurance monitoring process within the accounting profession in Ireland. The study centred
on the question as to whether the process adds value to the client using the services of an
accountant or is just another cost to the firm. Following a literature review, a number of key
areas were identified and some issues arose that the author felt would be best answered by
members of the profession. The author chose semi-structured interviews as the method to
collect the primary data from the profession. Data was collected from all sections of the
profession by conducting interviews with accountants, representatives of the main PABs
and with Ian Drennan of IAASA. This allowed all those involved in the industry to offer their
perceptions and opinions.
5.2 Summary of Findings
Previous research from Alafaji (2007) indicated that a three year cycle was most appropriate
for quality assurance monitoring visits. This statutory requirement in Ireland is for a six year
cycle with PIEs being visited every three years. The primary data indicates that not all PABs
are complying with this directive. Resource restrictions and ongoing investigations into
financial institutions are having an impact on the frequency of visits by some PABs.
The process used by the PABs is similar to that used in other countries although there is
some diversity between the bodies in terms of grades awarded and their approach to the
quality end of the visit.
All respondents were very positive in their attitude towards the monitoring visit and felt
that although there was a cost involved, it was a beneficial process. The larger firms do not
feel the impact of the monitoring visit as much as the smaller firms although smaller firms
do gain more benefit from them as it tends to improve their systems and procedures more.
It was stated that the monitoring process alone does not ensure that a quality service is
provided to the client but it does help improve those who are not providing services at an
adequate standard.
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The initial setting up of a quality control system is time consuming but thereafter does not
prove burdensome. It was generally felt that a quality system has to become embedded in
the culture of the firm and by achieving this, the monitoring visits become less stressful and
can be used to further tweak and improve the existing system.
It was generally felt that clients do not understand the benefits they receive from the firm
having a quality system and monitoring visits. This is in agreement with a previous report
from the POB (2010) in the UK. When the client engages an accountant, they expect a
quality service to be provided. Accountants and firms providing non-regulatory or non-audit
services are not subject to the same stringent monitoring visits as those firms providing
audit services, although because they are a member of a PAB they are subject to a certain
level of supervision. Accountants who are not members of a PAB are not subject to any
monitoring. The increase in the audit exemption threshold means that more accountants
are being subject to less monitoring.
The fact that the term accountant is not legally protected is an issue for accountants and the
PABs. They feel it is damaging for the profession because it allows people to provide
services outside of the monitoring and supervisory process. Although IAASA are in
agreement that the term should be protected, they question the extent of the problem.
They also state that the services being provided outside of the regulatory areas are low risk.
This contradicts the view of the PABs who require members to pass exams and complete
three years of experience before they will issue a practicing cert to their members so that
they can provide those same services to the public.
This research finds that the monitoring process in the regulatory areas such as auditing to
be effective and well received by the practicing accountants. There are some discrepancies
between the PABs regarding frequency of visits and the structure of the visits. The
monitoring process is focused on the audit function and outside the audit function the
process is much less rigorous.
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5.3 Recommendations of Future Study
Several areas of future study have been identified. The research has identified an area of
the accounting profession that is outside of the monitoring and supervisory process. An
investigation into this area would be beneficial as it could quantify the level of work that is
being performed, the extent of the services being provided and the quality of those services.
The requirement which the PABs place on members before they issue practicing certificates
is also an area for future research. The level of competency that the PABs demand is much
higher than that which the statutory regulators necessitate. An investigation in this area
would determine which approach is the most appropriate.
5.4 Concluding Remarks
The aim of this research was to determine if the quality assurance monitoring process of the
accounting profession added value to the services that are being provided by accountants to
their clients or is it just an additional cost to the firm.
This research concludes that the monitoring process does add value for the client. Clients of
smaller firms gain more benefit from the process than clients of the larger firms, although
the clients do not necessarily recognise this. The monitoring process in regulatory areas is
robust but there are questions surrounding the supervision of accountants providing
services outside the regulatory areas.
There is undoubtedly an additional cost in implementing a quality system that satisfies the
monitoring process but that cost is minimal when compared to the benefits of having an
efficiently run office. An effective quality system is cost effective in the long term.
Professional accountants in Ireland adapt well to regulatory changes and want to provide a
quality service to their clients. Changes in regulations may suggest that the PABs have to
look at how they enrol and supervise their members in order to ensure that the profession
continues to provide the current standard of client service.
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